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ADMIRALTY-LIABILITY-TRANSITORY U NSEAWORTHINESs-While loading 
grain aboard a ship, the petitioners, longshoremen, were injured when 
they inhaled noxious fumes from a shot of grain released into the vessel's 
hold, the grain having been treated with a chemical insecticide by unknown 
parties at an inland point. Petitioners brought suit against the city, which 
owned the grain elevators, and the shipowner, alleging, among other things,1 
that the vessel was unseaworthy. The district court found the ship to be 
seaworthy,2 and the circuit court of appeals affirmed the judgment for the 
1 Petitioners also claimed that the City of Galveston and the shipowner were liable 
on the basis of negligence. The district court, in finding that the city had not applied 
the chemical to the grain and that neither party knew or should have known in the 
exercise of reasonable care that the grain had been improperly fumigated by unknown 
parties at an inland point, held that neither w~ negligent. Morales v. City of Galveston, 
181 F. Supp. 202 (S.D. Tex. 1959). The finding was examined and affirmed twice by 
the circuit court of appeals. 275 F.2d 191 (5th Cir. 1960), and 291 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1961). 
The Supreme Court, not finding the facts clearly erroneous under the principle laid 
down in McAllister v. United States, 348 U.S. 19 (1954), affirmed the circuit court's 
decision. 
2 Morales v. City of Galveston, 181 F. Supp. 202 (S.D. Tex. 1959). 
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defendant.3 On certiorari4 the Supreme Court vacated the judgment and 
remanded the case to the court of appeals for consideration in light of 
Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc./> which had been decided in the interim. 
However, the circuit court again affirmed the district court's decision.6 
On certiorari, held, affirmed, three Justices dissenting.7 The cause of the 
injury was not any defect in the ship, but rather the isolated and com-
pletely unforeseeable introduction of a noxious agent from without. Mo-
rales v. City of Galveston, 370 U.S. 165 (1962). 
Seamen are afforded three types of actions to recover for personal in-
juries: maintenance and cure,8 negligence,9 and breach of the warranty of 
seaworthiness.10 Before the 1940's the doctrine of unseaworthiness was vir-
tually unused in personal injury cases, but since that time it has been uti-
lized to such an extent that it threatens to make the other two modes of 
recovery obsolete.11 In 1946, with its decision in Seas Shipping Co. v. Sie-
racki,12 the Supreme Court transformed the unseaworthiness doctrine from 
one involving a duty to exercise ordinary care to that of an absolute duty 
to provide a seaworthy vessel.13 A statement of the doctrine which has been 
a Morales v. City of Galveston, 275 F.2d 191 (5th Cir. 1960). 
4 Morales v. City of Galveston, 364 U.S. 295 (1960). 
IS 362 U.S. 539 (1960). 
6 Morales v. City of Galveston, 291 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1961). The court, considering 
Mitchell inapplicable to the facts of the principal case, stated: "This is not a case, as 
Mitchell's was, where it was conceded that the ship was unseaworthy but the seaworthi-
ness was excused, in the Court of Appeals, because it was only temporary. This is a 
case where the district judge found as a fact that the vessel was seaworthy." Id. at 98. 
7 Mr. Justice Frankfurter took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. 
8 Maintenance and cure is not a general compensatory remedy. It is limited to medical 
care, living expenses during the recuperation period, and wages for the duration of the 
employment contract if employed in coastal trade, or for the duration of the voyage 
if employed on an ocean-going vessel. Longshoremen are not covered by the maintenance 
and cure remedy, but they can receive compensation under the Longshoremen's and 
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. 44 Stat. 1424 (1927), as amended, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 
(1958). See GILMORE & BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 265-71 (1957). 
o Jones Act, 41 Stat. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1958). 
10 The shipowner's absolute duty to provide a seaworthy vessel for his seamen was 
extended by Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946), to cover longshoremen, and 
by Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953), to cover other harbor workers who 
perform tasks traditionally done by seamen. 
11 GILMORE & BLACK, op. cit. supra note 8, at 316. 
12 328 U.S. 85 (1946). The defendant had actually conceded the point that the ship-
owner's duty to provide a seaworthy vessel was absolute, and the case turned on the issue 
of whether or not longshoremen were covered by the doctrine. 
13 The first mention of the doctrine by the Supreme Court as a basis for recovery was 
in The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1903); however, such liability was clearly premised on the 
shipowner's negligence. In Carlisle Packing Co. v. Sandanger, 259 U.S. 255 (1922), the 
Supreme Court, in confusing the shipowner's absolute obligation of seaworthiness as to 
cargo with his obligation toward his seamen, stated in dictum that a shipowner's duty 
to furnish a seaworthy vessel for his seamen was absolute. Twenty-two years later in 
Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96 (1944), the Supreme Court again stated that 
a shipowner's duty to his seamen to furnish a seaworthy ship was absolute and not 
predicated on negligence and not satisfied by the e.xercise of due care. However, because 
the injury was in fact attributable to the negligence of the shipowner's employees, this 
general statement was dictum. 
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repeatedly followed by the Supreme Court was expounded in that case, 
where the Court stated that a shipowner has an absolute duty to furnish 
his seamen with a vessel and appurtenances which are reasonably fit for 
their intended use.14 After Sieracki the only questions remaining con-
cerned the categories of persons and types of situations to which the doc-
trine was to be applied. While the courts rapidly extended the doctrine,15 
. this extension met a serious curtailment in the area of temporary or transi-
tory defects. In Cookingham v. United States16 the Third Circuit devel-
oped the "transitory hazard" doctrine, which declared that a condition 
which temporarily makes an inherently seaworthy vessel unsafe does not 
constitute unseaworthiness, unless the shipowner had actual or construc-
tive notice of the condition and a reasonable opportunity to correct it. 
The Third Circuit thus refused to extend the expanding duty of sea-
worthiness so as to require the shipowner to keep inherently sound and 
seaworthy appliances free from temporarily unsafe conditions resulting 
from their use.17 The theory behind the approach taken in the Cooking-
ham decision was not unopposed. In Poignant v. United States18 the Court 
of Appeals for the Second Circuit stated that actual or constructive notice 
of the unseaworthy condition was not essential to the existence of a cause 
of action. However, the court held that a ship does not become unsea-
worthy by reason of a temporary condition caused by a transient substance, 
if the vessel was as fit £or service as similar vessels in similar service.19 
Despite Poignant, Cookingham's influence was felt in a substantial num-
ber of decisions,20 until the Supreme Court in Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, 
14 See, e.g., Michalic v. Cleveland Tankers, Inc., 364 U.S. 325 (1960); Mitchell v. 
Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539 (1960); Boudoin v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 348 U.S. 336 
(1955); Pope &: Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953). 
15 See, e.g., Alaska S.S. Co. v. Petterson, 347 U.S. 396 (1954), where the Court declared 
that a shipowner's warranty of seaworthiness was non-delegable and thus his absolute 
duty was not affected by relinquishing control to another; and Boudoin v. Lykes Bros. 
S.S. Co., supra note 14, where the Court extended the scope of the seaworthiness doctrine 
to include activity by a ship's personnel. 
16 184 F.2d 213 (3d Cir. 1950). 
17 In Cookingham the plaintiff had slipped on some jello which had been accidentally 
deposited on the ship's stairway. 
18 225 F.2d 595 (2d Cir. 1955). The plaintiff had slipped on an apple skin in the 
passageway through which garbage cans were pulled for dumping because of the absence 
of garbage disposal chutes on the vessel. 
19 Judge Frank, although in favor of reversing the lower court, stated in his con• 
curring opinion that "the period during which the stairway [referring to Cookingham] 
was in an unsafe state is immaterial under the circumstances of the instant case. If the 
stairway was in a condition dangerous for the use for which it was intended, however 
'transitorily', it was unseaworthy. It remained so while the unsafe condition persisted. 
The element of time which has intruded itself in this case in both the opinion of this 
court and that of the court below is irrelevant under the doctrine of the shipowner's 
absolute liability." Id. at 603. 
20 E.g., Shannon v. Union Barge Line Corp., 194 F.2d 584 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 
344 U.S. 846 (1952); McMahan v. The Panamolga, 127 F. Supp. 659 (D. Md. 1955); 
Garrison v. United States, 121 F. Supp. 617 (N.D. Cal. 1954); Daniels v. Pacific-Atlantic 
S.S. Co., 120 F. Supp. 96 (E.D.N.Y. 1954); Adamowski v. Gulf Oil Corp., 93 F. Supp. 
115 (E.D. Pa. 1950), aff'd, 197 F.2d 523 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 906 (1952). 
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lnc.21 overruled the Cookingham doctrine, and declared that a shipowner's 
actual or constructive knowledge of an unseaworthy condition is not es-
sential to his liability. 
In light of the Mitchell decision and the general discussion in the 
principal case, it seems quite clear that the Supreme Court intended to 
impose the same strict liability upon shipowners for unseaworthiness caused 
by transitory defects as was imposed for unseaworthiness caused by per-
manent defects, or conditions arising before commencement of the voyage. 
Since both Mitchell and Morales involved transitory conditions, it might 
appear that they are in conflict, if one attempted to distinguish them on 
their facts. But, because they decided basically different questions, they are 
not really inconsistent. In Mitchell the Supreme Court did not decide the 
unseaworthiness issue but rather, since the lower court had erroneously 
instructed the jury on the law, reversed and remanded the case for a new 
trial under the proper criteria. Hence, the Mitchell case could have still 
been decided for the defendant on the facts. In the principal case the 
Supreme Court supported the lower court's decision based upon a finding 
of fact that the ship was seaworthy. Thus, since different issues were in-
volved in the two cases, a reconciliation of the decisions upon their facts 
is not required to make them consistent. 
Although the general discussions in the two cases indicate that the 
Supreme Court intended to impose the same strict liability upon ship-
owners for transitory unseaworthiness as for permanent conditions of un-
seaworthiness, the peculiar problem involved in cases of defects of a tran-
sitory nature remains unresolved-namely, as of what moment in time 
should a court pose the decisive question: was the ship reasonably safe for 
its intended use? If attention is focused only upon the exact moment of 
the accident, all other factors become irrelevant, and the specific question 
in the principal case becomes: when the hold of the ship was filled with 
noxious fumes was the ship reasonably fit for its intended use? With the 
seaworthiness test framed in this way, there would almost certainly be 
liability.22 By this approach it is reasoned that since constructive or actual 
knowledge is not a prerequisite for unseaworthiness, the amount of time 
during which the condition has existed is irrelevant to the question of 
whether the ship was unseaworthy.23 The Supreme Court did not take 
21 362 U.S. 539 (1960). The plaintiff had slipped on the ship's rail where slime and 
fish gurry had been deposited during an earlier unloading of fish. The district court had 
instructed, and the court of appeals affirmed, that the liability for unseaworthiness could 
attach only if the alleged condition was "there for a reasonably long period of time so 
that a shipowner ought to have seen that it was removed." The Supreme Court reversed 
on this basis. 
22 This has been the approach favored by such men as Judge Clark [See dissent in 
Paddu v. Royal Netherlands S.S. Co., 303 F.2d 752 (2d Cir. 1962).], Judge Frank [See 
concurring opinion in Poignant v. United States, 225 F.2d 595, 599 (2d Cir. 1955).], and 
Judge Rives [See dissent in Morales v. City of Galveston, 291 F.2d 97, 98 (5th Cir. 1961).]. 
See NORRIS, THE LAW OF MARITIME PERSONAL INJURIES § 36, at 85 (1959). 
23 For cases that have held this way, see Grzybowski v. Arrow Barge Co., 283 F.2d 
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this approach; it took into consideration a number of factors, including 
the length of time during which the defect existed. Even though the Court 
did not specifically discuss how the duration of the defect affected the un-
seaworthiness question, the fact that it did not focus its attention solely 
upon the exact moment of injury shows that the Court intended that, in 
deciding the question of reasonable fitness, the factor of duration of time 
should be taken into consideration.24 Unfortunately, the Court gave no 
indication of the rationale behind its approach of drawing distinctions 
with respect to the length of time that a defect may exist, nor did the 
Court indicate how it intends to use the time factor in a positive fashion 
in helping to solve the transitory unseaworthiness question. Significantly, 
the Court, by refusing to determine the unseaworthiness question as of 
the exact moment of injury, nevertheless indicated the basic method or 
approach it intends should be followed. The principal case is thus a clari-
fication of the test of reasonable fitness laid down as a generality in Mitchell 
-reasonableness is to include the factor of the duration of the defect.25 
The Court considered it significant that the introduction of the con-
taminated grain was an "isolated" and "completely unforeseeable" incident. 
The Court's use of the words "isolated" and "completely unforeseeable," 
without further explanation, is unfortunate. The concept of foreseeability 
has special significance in the common law of negligence, and it might 
appear that the Supreme Court is incorporating negligence concepts into 
the seaworthiness doctrine. However, it can be confidently asserted that 
the Court had no such intention. Since the time of Sieracki the Supreme 
Court has consistently rejected the incorporation of common-law concepts 
of negligence into the seaworthiness doctrine, and in Mitchell the Court 
specifically overruled a lower court's decision for what it thought consti-
tuted such an incorporation. However, in using the test of reasonable fit-
ness, as it consistently has, the Court must implicitly involve itself in 
problems of foreseeability. The determination of reasonableness must 
necessarily be arrived at on the basis of experience, and this means that 
similar experiences are foreseen for the future which, within the bounds 
of business practicality, will, if dangerous, be guarded against. Thus the 
481 (4th Cir. 1960); Calderola v. Cunard S.S. Co., 279 F.2d 475 (2d Cir. 1960); Gentry v. 
States S.S. Co., 229 Ore. 233, 366 P.2d 880 (1961). 
24 See Pinto v. States Marine Corp., 296 F.2d 1, 6 (2d Cir. 1961), where the court 
said, "A conclusion that liability for a temporary condition is not different in legal 
nature from liability for a permanent one does not mean that the duration of the 
condition, the -measures prescribed for dealing with it, and the feasibility of achieving 
perfect safety at all times, are irrelevant .... " 
25 The Court's statement that it supported the lower court's finding of fact that the 
absence of a forced ventilation system in the hold did not constitute unseaworthiness 
goes to the heart of the problem of determining whether there was a structural or 
permanent defect, but seemingly is a separate problem from the transitory defect question. 
However, it might be argued that focusing part of its attention upon the structure of 
the ship is a method or device whereby the Court took the duration of the defect factor 
into consideration without specifically discussing it. 
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very definition of reasonableness implies foresight. This seems to be the 
sense in which the Court uses "foreseeable" in the principal case. It is 
also consistent with the Court's stating that it is not imposing an insurer's 
liability,26 since insurers do not need to foresee an accident in order to be 
liable. The line between this sort of foreseeability and negligence is ex-
tremely difficult to draw, and the distinction perhaps rests on the degree 
to which foreseeability is used as a measure of the shipowners' care or as 
a measure of what is reasonably fit and the degree to which business prac-
ticality forbids consideration of slight possibilities. 
Underlying this entire problem are certain policy considerations that 
must have exerted their influence upon the Court. There already is one 
strict liability type cause of action for maritime workers-maintenance 
and cure for injured seamen and the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' 
Compensation Act for other maritime workers. Should a second strict lia-
bility type cause of action be established so that workers can obtain larger 
recoveries such as those in negligence actions, bearing in mind that the 
Jones Act is available to seamen injured by negligence? The Court has 
already seen fit to establish such a second cause of action through the sea-
worthiness doctrine, so the pertinent question presently is whether the fac-
tors which dictated its establishment also call for going farther and impos-
ing an insurer's liability. There are seemingly no relevant factors to justify 
the imposition of this liability upon shipping alone among all of the 
nation's industries. In electing to follow the narrower of the two pos-
sible approaches, namely, taking many factors into consideration, the 
duration of the defect being just one such factor, rather than focusing 
upon the exact moment of the injury with no other factors being relevant, 
the Court rejected the opportunity to expand greatly the scope of the 
unseaworthiness concept, refusing to take what would have been an enor-
mous step toward making shipowners insurers of personal injuries. 
Richard DeLamielleure 
26 See, e.g., Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 550 (1960); Boudoin v. 
Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 348 U.S. 336, 338-39 (1955). 
